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Multilateral Development Banks, Their Member States and Public Accountability: A 
Proposal1 
Daniel D. Bradlow2 
Abstract 
More than 25 years ago the multilateral development banks (MDBs) began establishing 
independent accountability mechanisms (IAMs), such as the World Bank’s Inspection Panel, to 
address concerns about MDB accountability to those communities and groups who were 
harmed by their decisions and actions. This essay argues that these mechanisms need updating. 
In the interests of promoting new and creative thinking about these mechanisms, it makes an 
ambitious two-part proposal designed to improve the efficacy of the IAMs, while also respecting 
the sovereignty of their member states and protecting an appropriate level of immunity for the 
MDBs. First, the MDBs should jointly create a super- IAM that can receive requests for 
investigations from people who allege that they have been harmed by the failure of any MDB 
to comply with its own policies and procedures. Second, the MDB stakeholders should create 
an independent fund, financed by contributions from individuals, corporations, foundations, 
states and international organizations, that can provide support to communities and individuals 
who the super-IAM found were harmed by a non-compliant MDB-funded project. 
One of the most significant developments in international affairs since the Second World War 
has been the expanding role of international organizations. They were designed to act with 
restraint, out of respect for the sovereignty of their member states, and in support of their 
member state’s efforts to promote international peace and security, international economic 
cooperation and promote human welfare.3 However, some of them are now actively engaged in 
performing such functions in their member states as peacekeeping; managing refugee camps; 
reviewing the performance of national financial sectors; financing and monitoring the 
implementation of development projects and programmes; giving policy advice and providing 
technical assistance.4 This means that these organizations are making decisions that are directly 
affecting the lives of the citizens of their member states.   
1 All Rights Reserved. Do not quote or distribute without permission of the author.  
2 SARCHI Professor of International Development Law and African Economic Relations, University of Pretoria 
and Professor of Law Emeritus, American University Washington College of Law. Email: 
danny.bradlow@up.ac.za The author thanks Mallika Sen for her excellent research assistance with this article.  
3JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS LAW (3rd ed. 2015). 
4id. 
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This evolution in their operations has implications for the relationship between individual 
international organizations and their member states and for their accountability to those who 
are affected by their operations. 
The multilateral development banks(MDBs) provide a good illustration of these changes in the 
role of international organizations. They have evolved from institutions focused on merely 
funding specific projects into entities involved in a range of development financing and 
advisory activities in their member states. They have also become leaders in formulating, 
interpreting and applying standards for dealing with the environmental and social impacts of 
development projects. Consequently, their decisions are directly affecting the societies in which 
the projects and programmes they fund are located. These developments have raised concerns 
about how those communities or groups that are adversely affected by their operations can hold 
the MDBs accountable for their decisions and their impacts. 
This essay will discuss how the MDBs5 -- the World Bank Group, the African, Asian, and Inter-
American Development Banks and more recently the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank – are 
dealing with the issue of accountability. It will argue that, although the MDBs have been leaders 
in promoting international organizational accountability, their mechanisms of accountability 
are not keeping up with the evolution in their operations. In the interests of promoting new and 
creative thinking about these issues, it will also make an ambitious proposal for how the MDBs 
jointly can more effectively meet the accountability challenge that they face while also 
respecting the sovereignty of their member states and protecting an appropriate level of 
immunity for the MDBs.  
5These are the most prominent MDBs and the most significant either globally or in their regions. Consequently, 
they are the focus of this article. For more information on these banks see generally THE WORLD BANK GROUP, 
https://www.worldbank.org/ (last visited May 11, 2019); THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 
https://www.afdb.org/en/(last visited May 11, 2019); THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, https://www.adb.org/(last 
visited May 11, 2019); THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, https://www.iadb.org/en(last visited May 11, 
2019); THE EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT BANK, https://www.ebrd.com/home(last 
visited May 11, 2019); THE ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK, https://www.aiib.org/en/index.html (last 
visited May 11, 2019); THE NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK, https://www.ndb.int/ (last visited May 11, 2019).For more 
information on the international law relating to the MDBs see generally DANIEL D. BRADLOW& DAVID HUNTER, 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010). However, it is important to note that 
are other MDBs, such as the Islamic Development Bank and sub-regional MDBs like the CorporaciónAndina de 
Fomento and the East African Development Bank.  
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The paper is divided into two parts. The first part will provide some background on the MDBs 
and their current approach to accountability. The second part discusses the proposal for 
improving MDB accountability. 
Background on the MDBs 
The oldest MDB, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or Bank), 
was created at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 and opened for business in 1946.6 It has 
been the model for all the MDBs created thereafter. Consequently, the points made below are 
applicable to all the MDBs listed above, even though the discussion focuses on the IBRD, which 
is the largest part of the World Bank Group.  
When a state7 joins the IBRD it is authorized to buy a certain number of shares in the Bank. 
The number of shares is determined by a formula that takes into account the size of the country’s 
economy and its contribution to the global economy. The member state is only required to pay 
a small portion of the price of each share and to commit to provide the rest of the price if called 
upon to do so. Each member state’s vote depends on the number of shares that it owns. This 
means that the Bank operates with a weighted voting system in which the member states do not 
have equal votes.8 
At the time of its creation, the IBRD was a bold innovation in global finance. There had never 
been an institution like it. Consequently, there was considerable uncertainty about how 
effectively it would function. The first source of uncertainty was that the member states were 
sovereign states but they were joining an organization which would operate on the basis of 
weighted voting and not on the principle of the sovereign equality of states. This suggested that 
a state could find itself bound by a decision or action that it had specifically opposed.9 
6 Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, July 22, 1944 [IBRD 
Articles of Agreement].   
7Only sovereign states that are members of the International Monetary Fund can join the IBRD. See Art II (1), 
IBRD Articles of Agreement 
8Daniel D. Bradlow, International Law and the Operations of the International Financial Institutions, in 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2010). 
9EDWARD S. MASON & ROBERT E. ASHER, THE WORLD BANK SINCE BRETTON WOODS (1973); DEVESH KAPUR, 
JOHN P. LEWIS AND RICHARD WEBB, THE WORLD BANK: ITS FIRST HALF CENTURY (1997). 
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The drafters of the Bank’s Articles of Agreement sought to assure member states that the Bank 
would respect their sovereignty by stipulating that its staff would operate in a fair and objective 
way. They were specifically prohibited from being influenced by the political character of the 
member state and were instructed that their decision-making should only be based on economic 
considerations, which should be evaluated impartially.10 The Articles also stipulate that the 
IBRD staff owe their loyalty to the Bank and that they cannot show any favour to any individual 
state.11These arrangements suggested that the Bank would focus their loan conditions on the 
economic and financial aspects of the projects they were funding and would defer to the 
borrower’s decisions, which many states saw as part of their sovereign prerogatives, regarding 
the project’s social, political, cultural and environmental implications.  
A second source of uncertainty related to the fact that the IBRD would be operating within the 
territory of each of its member states. This created a risk that each member state could assert its 
jurisdiction over the Bank and interfere with its operations.12 In other words, member states 
could use their sovereignty to undermine the multinational character and mission of the Bank 
and interfere with its ability to protect its rights as a creditor. In order to protect against this 
risk, the Articles granted the IBRD full immunity from the jurisdiction of its member states 
unless the Bank specifically waived its immunity.13 
Over time, confidence in the IBRD and the other MDBs grew and these concerns were allayed. 
Slowly their role began expanding beyond merely providing finance for infrastructure projects 
in qualifying member states. They also began providing policy advice, technical assistance and 
funding for a broad range of development activities. They also began playing a more active role 
in the design and implementation of the projects and programmes that they financed. Their more 
active role created the possibility that their decisions could directly impact, and therefore cause 
harm to, the communities and social groups affected by their operations.14 
These developments coincided with a growing general awareness of the need for project 
sponsors to account for all the significant social and environmental impacts of their projects.15 
10 Article IV (10), IBRD Articles of Agreement. 
11 Article V (5)(c), IBRD Articles of Agreement. 
12Klabbers, supra note 1.  
13Article VII, IBRD Articles of Agreement. 
14Kapur, Lewis and Webb, supra note 9; Bradlow, supra note 8. 
15 Daniel D. Bradlow, Development Decision Making and the Content of International Development Law 21 South 
African J. Human Rights 47-85 (2005) available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=788070. 
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This means that they should assess these impacts in advance and should address them in their 
project design, implementation and management plans. It also means that their funders should 
make sure that the project sponsors have adequately assessed and addressed all these impacts 
before they commit to funding the projects.  This pushed the MDBs to assume an active role in 
overseeing their borrowers’ assessments of the social and environmental impacts of the projects 
that they funded. They also formulating more detailed operational policies and procedures 
(OPPs) to help their borrowers and staff understand each particular MDB’s approach to these 
issues.16 
The MDBs faced a challenge when they took on this new role. There were only a few 
universally accepted principles that were applicable to these environmental and social issues. 
The most accepted requirement was that each project sponsor must conduct an environmental 
and social impact assessment (ESIA) before deciding to undertake the project.17However, there 
were not internationally agreed and universally accepted standards on how to allocate the costs 
and benefits associated with the identified impacts. Historically, this decision was viewed as a 
sovereign prerogative.  
It is important to note that there are international legal standards that are widely accepted and 
are applicable to the management of some of these issues. For example, almost all the MDB 
member states have signed and ratified international human rights conventions.18These 
conventions stipulate what rights individuals have. They also make clear that the ultimate 
obligation to respect, protect and promote human rights rests with the state. However, they are 
stated in general terms and they do not clarify how the responsibilities to deal with human rights 
in a particular project or transaction should be managed. They also do not address, with any 
specificity, how these responsibilities should be shared between the state, the borrower, the 
16 The World Bank, Policies and Procedures: Operations Manual 
https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/Pages/Manuals/Operational%20Manual.aspx (last visited on May 11, 
2019). 
17See David. B. Hunter, International Law and Public Participation in Policy-Making at the International 
Financial Institutions, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 199 (2010); 
DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN, DURWOOD ZAEKLE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY (5th 
ed., 2015). 
18See United Nations, Human Rights, https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/human-rights/ (last visited on 
May 11, 2019); Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), The Core International Human 
Rights Instruments and their Monitoring Bodies, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx (last visited on May 11, 2019); 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 6 
I.L.M. 360 (1967), 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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project sponsor, and the funder in a particular project or transaction. This means, in effect, that 
each state, each borrower, each project sponsor and each funder must exercise its own discretion 
in determining whether to support a particular project, based on their assessment of the social 
and environmental impacts and how they will be managed. It also means that there is a high 
risk in complex projects with substantial social and environmental impacts that key project 
decision makers will be accused of making decisions that are not compliant with the applicable 
international standards.  This is because the decisions are unavoidably being made in conditions 
of imperfect knowledge and they are inherently controversial.  
It is therefore not surprising that the MDBs’ engagement with these environmental and social 
issues generated tension between their rich member states and borrower member states.19 The 
former group were strong advocates for implementing high environmental and social standards 
in MDB-funded projects. It should be noted that it was easy for these states to take this position 
because they do not borrow from the MDBs and so the MDBs would not be applying these 
standards to their projects.  
The borrower member states who would have to assume the burden of complying with whatever 
standards the MDBs adopted were more cautious. They argued that it was their sovereign 
prerogative to decide how much environmental and social risk they would assume in their 
development projects and how they would allocate and manage these risks. They also contended 
that, pursuant to their Articles, the MDBs were required to only consider economic factors in 
their decision-making. They maintained that managing environmental and social issues requires 
making political judgements and so should be treated by the MDBs as political concerns. This 
meant that, from their perspective, the MDBs were exceeding their mandates by commenting 
on these issues.  
This tension was exacerbated by the advocacy of both local and international civil society 
groups who opposed certain projects on environmental and social grounds. Since there was no 
obvious forum in which these groups could take their concerns and have them addressed on 
19 Most of the MDBs divide their member states into categories indicating which states are eligible to borrow 
from the MDB and which are not. For example, the World Bank Group divides member states into different 
groups for purposes of determining eligibility to borrow based on GNI per capita: in general, member states with 
an annual GNI per capita below US$12055 ( 2017 dollars) are eligible to borrow from the World Bank Group and 
those with an annual GNI per capita above US$12056 (2017 dollars) are not eligible to borrow. See, World Bank 
Country and Lending Groups , https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-
country-and-lending-groups(last visited on May 13, 2019). 
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their merits, they tended to take their campaigns to the media and to lobby their own countries’ 
governments, politicians and World Bank Executive Directors. As a result, these campaigns 
became politicized and the source of serious reputational risk for the World Bank. This was 
demonstrated in the 1980s by the handling of such controversial World Bank projects as the 
Narmada Dam in India and road projects in the Amazon area of Brazil.20
To its credit, the World Bank responded creatively to this challenge by establishing the 
Inspection Panel.21  This was the first mechanism in an international organization which non-
state actors can utilize to hold the organization directly accountable for the consequences of its 
conduct.  
The Inspection Panel is an independent three-member panel that is authorized to investigate 
complaints from any two or more people who claim they have been harmed or threatened with 
harm by the failure of the World Bank to comply with its OPPs. They are independent of the 
management of the Bank. Panel members are appointed for one non-renewable five-year term 
by the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors (the Board) and they report directly to the Board. 
In addition, they can only be fired for cause by the Board.  
The Panel is authorized to receive any request for an investigation from any two or more persons 
who allege that they have been harmed or threatened with harm by the Bank’s failure to comply 
with its own OPPs. The Board decides whether to approve the request and authorize the Panel 
to investigate, based on a recommendation from the Panel. If the investigation is improved, the 
Panel, after conducting an independent investigation, submits its findings to the Board, which 
can accept or reject these findings. The Board will publicly release the Panel report and the 
management’s response to the report after its deliberations on the report. The management is 
expected to develop an action plan for addressing any issues of non-compliance identified by 
the Panel. 
20 Bradford Morse & Thomas R. Berger, Sardar Sarovar- Report of the Independent Review, INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW RESEARCH CENTRE, http://ielrc.org/Content/c9202.pdf (last visited on May 12, 2019); 
BRUCE REICH, THE WORLD BANK AND THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION (2013) 
21The World Bank Inspection Panel was established on Sept. 22, 1993, by IBRD Res. No. 93-10 and IDA No. 
Res. 93-6 of the Bank's Board, as reviewed, clarified and supplemented by the Board on October 17, 1996 in the 
"Review of the Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel – 1996Clarification of Certain Aspects of the 
Resolution", and April 20, 1999 in the"1999 Clarification of the Board's Second Review of the Inspection Panel"; 
IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL: IN PRACTICE (2nd ed., 2000); Daniel Bradlow, 
International Organizations and Private Complaints: The Case of the World Bank Inspection Panel, 34(3) 
VIRGINIA J. INT’L LAW (1994). 
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It is important to note that the Panel only investigates the compliance of the Bank staff with the 
OPPs and does not look into the conduct of the borrower or of any other actor in the project. 
Since the Panel does not investigate its member states, it does not implicate their sovereignty. 
After the World Bank established the Inspection Panel, the other MDBs created their own 
independent accountability mechanisms (IAMs)22. They all have the same basic approach to 
independence and to investigating non-compliance by their staff with the applicable 
OPPs.23Over time, cooperation between the IAMs has grown. They have now formed a network 
that meets once a year to share information and experiences.24 As part of this meeting, they also 
meet with a counterpart network that consists of civil society groups that have an interest in 
these mechanisms.  
More than 25 years have passed since the first IAM was established. Consequently, there has 
been sufficient time to assess the IAMs’ strengths and weaknesses.25 
The most obvious contribution of the IAMs is that they provide a means for holding those with 
authority accountable for the way in which they exercise their authority.26 Thus, they have 
22See, for example, THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK- INDEPENDENT REVIEW MECHANISM (IAM),
https://www.afdb.org/en/independent-review-mechanism/(last visited on May 12, 2019); THE ASIAN 
DEVELOPMENT BANK- ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISM, https://www.adb.org/site/accountability-
mechanism/main(last visited on May 12, 2019); THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK- INDEPENDENT 
CONSULTATION AND INVESTIGATION MECHANISM, https://www.iadb.org/en/mici/independent-consultation-and-
investigation-mechanism (last visited on May 12, 2019); THE ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT BANK- 
PROJECT-AFFECTED PEOPLE’S MECHANISM, https://www.aiib.org/en/policies-strategies/operational-
policies/policy-on-the-project-affected-mechanism.html(last visited on May 12, 2019); THE EUROPEAN BANK FOR 
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT- PROJECT COMPLAINT MECHANISM, https://www.ebrd.com/work-with-
us/project-finance/project-complaint-mechanism.html(last visited on May 12, 2019). 
23 However, in addition to investigating compliance with the applicable OPPs, the IAMs at the other MDBs – but 
not the Inspection Panel – also undertake dispute resolution. This means that they use their good offices to deal 
with disputes between affected communities and the MDB’s borrower. These dispute resolution procedures are 
entirely voluntary.  
24INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS NETWORK, http://independentaccountabilitymechanism.net/ 
(last visited on May 12, 2019). 
25 This paper will not focus on their substantive work which would require an analysis of their cases, which is 
beyond the scope of this paper. For examples of cases in which Inspection Panel has produced benefits for 
requesters see, Chapter 3 and 4 relating to the Jamuna Bridge project and the Uganda Hydropower project in THE 
WORLD BANK, ACCOUNTABILITY AT THE WORLD BANK: THE INSPECTION PANEL (2003). But cases before the 
Inspection Panel do not always bring satisfactory results for requesters- see DANA CLARK, JONATHAN A. FOX AND 
KAY TREAKLE, DEMANDING ACCOUNTABILITY: CIVIL SOCIETY CLAIMS AND THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION 
PANEL (2003).. 
26D. Bradlow and A. Naude Fourie, The Operational Policies and Procedures of the World Bank and the 
International Finance Corporation: Creating Law-Making and Law Governed Institutions, 10 International 
Organizations Law Review 3 (2013) 
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encouraged the management and staff of the MDBs to place greater emphasis on complying 
with their institution’s OPPs as a way of demonstrating that they are exercising their decision-
making authority responsibly.  This is sometimes expressed in the World Bank as “Panel-
proofing” a project.27 This increased focus on OPP-compliance should help ensure that the 
MDBs are performing their mandates as effectively as possible.  
The IAM’s also contribute to the MDBs learning all the lessons that they can from their 
operations. In this regard, the IAMs offer the MDBs a unique opportunity. They are the only 
entity within the MDBs whose work is initiated by groups or communities that have been 
adversely affected by the projects that the MDBs fund. Consequently, they are able to offer the 
MDBs unique insights into their operations and the impact they have at a community level. It 
is important to recognize in this regard, that in many cases, the cause of the MDB staff’s failure 
to comply with the OPPs is that they are operating in complex environments with imperfect 
knowledge. As a result, the risk that, despite acting with great professional responsibility and 
judgement, they will make decisions that turn out to be sub-optimal, is not insignificant. The 
lessons learned function of the IAMs helps reduce this risk. It also helps the Bank staff and 
management learn how well their OPPs are functioning and to identify any weaknesses in the 
OPPs. The IAMs therefore should help the MDBs ensure that their OPPs are fit for purpose.  
Third, the IAMs contribute to making the MDBs more transparent. In order for the IAMs to 
function effectively, it is necessary that the banks make their OPPs publicly available. As a 
result, it is easier for outside stakeholders to learn more about the way in which the MDBs 
operate.  In fact, in recent years, some MDBs have engaged in extensive public consultations 
about their OPPs.28 
The IAMs are also facing some challenges. The first is that the tension that the IAMs created 
between borrower and creditor member states has persisted.29 This is due in part to borrower 
27Jonathan A. Fox, The World Bank Inspection Panel: Lessons from the First Five Years, 6(2) GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE279, 310 (2000). 
28The World Bank, Environmental and Social Framework, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/383011492423734099/pdf/114278-WP-REVISED-PUBLIC-
Environmental-and-Social-Framework.pdf (2017); THE WORLD BANK- PROJECTS AND OPERATIONS: 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL FRAMEWORK, https://www.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/environmental-
and-social-framework (last visited on May 12, 2019). 
29See, for example, A. Ebrahim and S. Herz, Accountability in Complex Organizations: World Bank Responses to 
Civil Society Working Paper 08-027, Harvard Business School, (2007) available at: 
https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/08-027_18c99232-358f-456e-b619-3056cb59e915.pdf 
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states’ ongoing concerns that the IAMs are unwittingly contributing to undermining their 
sovereignty and that they are causing problems for their governments. One reason is that 
complaints to the IAMs can lead to the requesters getting additional project benefits that are not 
available to communities and groups that have been adversely affected by non-MDB funded 
projects. Another is a concern that the government’s political opponents may use the IAMs to 
embarrass the government. This issue is important for the efficacy of the IAMs because one of 
their key contributions should be that they help to depoliticize disputes arising from MDB 
funded projects.  
There are two reasons to think that these tensions may now be more amenable to resolution. 
The first is that in a recent US Supreme Court case, Jam v IFC,30the Court ruled that, at least in 
US courts, international organizations have the same restricted immunity as states. The decision 
leaves many unanswered questions about the scope of MDB immunity and so increases the risk 
of litigation against MDBs with a presence in the US or in states that may choose to adopt a 
similar approach. This means that borrower countries now face the real possibility that their 
MDB-funded projects could end up in foreign courts, with unpredictable and potentially 
embarrassing outcomes. Based on the limited available jurisprudence31 and international human 
rights standards, the best way for them to avoid this unfortunate possibility is for the MDBs to 
provide those adversely affected by their operations with a meaningful remedy that courts could 
view as equivalent to a judicial remedy. 
The second, is that because of climate change, there is a growing appreciation around the world 
of the importance of accounting for the environmental and social impacts of projects.32 
Consequently, there should be increased willingness from all states to have the MDBs, which 
are generally seen to have state of the art OPPs, comply with these standards.  
Another important and complex challenge pertains to the situation in which the IAM’s 
investigation confirms that the relevant MDB has failed to comply with the applicable OPPs 
and that this has caused harm. In this case, the MDB management develops an action plan that 
30Jam v. International Finance Corp,586 U. S. __ (2019). 
31See for instance, Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, App. No. 26083/94Eur. Ct. H.R.  (1999). 
32See for instance, Network for Greening the Financial System, First Comprehensive Report: A Call for Action- 
Climate change as a Source of Financial Risk, https://www.banque-
france.fr/sites/default/files/media/2019/04/17/ngfs_first_comprehensive_report_-_17042019_0.pdf (last visited 
on May 12, 2019). 
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is intended to correct or mitigate the harm caused by the MDB.33 However, the cost of 
implementing this plan in effect is either paid by the borrower or the other borrowing member 
states even though the problem was caused by the MDB. The reason is that, unless the borrower 
pays for the implementation itself, the MDB’s action plan will be financed either by increasing 
the size of the borrower’s loan or, by the MDB itself paying the costs. In either case these 
resources will be drawn from the MDB’s existing pool of available funds thereby diminishing 
the amount available to other borrowing member states. Unfortunately, under existing 
arrangements it is hard to avoid this situation because there is no other readily available pot of 
money that can assist the adversely affected community. 
A fourth challenge for the IAMs is that in recent years the MDBs have increased the scale of 
their collaborations with each other.34 As a result, there are now more projects that are being 
jointly funded by two or more MDBs. In many cases, these projects are governed by the OPPs 
of the project’s lead MDB. This create sa risk that more than one IAM could receive a request 
for investigation from an affected community. In principle, each IAM will only investigate 
compliance with its own MDB’s operational policies.  The different IAMs might, therefore, 
either base their investigations and findings on different OPPs or on their own views of the lead 
MDB’s OPPs. Either approach will increase the risk of inconsistent findings being made by the 
different IAMs in jointly funded projects. 
The IAMs, the MDBs and their member states need to address these challenges without unduly 
restricting the MDBs ability to implement their mandates or undermining either the member 
states’ sovereignty or the accountability of the MDBs. The next section discusses a proposal 
that achieves these objectives. 
33See THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL, https://www.inspectionpanel.org/ (last visited on May 12, 2019); 
ANDRIA NAUDE FOURIE, THE WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL CASEBOOK (2014). 
34See African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, Inter-American Development Bank Group, International Fund for Agricultural Development, 
Islamic Development Bank Group and the World Bank Group, Multilateral Development Banks: Working 
together for more Effective Development Cooperation, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/mdb-brochure.pdf 
(last visited on May 12, 2019); Development Banks Working Together to Optimize Balance Sheets, THE WORLD 
BANK (Dec. 22, 2015) http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/12/22/development-banks-
optimize-balance-sheets; Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) Announced a Joint Framework for Aligning 
their Activities with the Goals of the Paris Agreement, THE WORLD BANK (Dec. 3, 2018) 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/12/03/multilateral-development-banks-mdbs-announced-
a-joint-framework-for-aligning-their-activities-with-the-goals-of-the-paris-
agreement?CID=CCG_TT_climatechange_EN_EXT.  
12 
A Proposal for Improving MDB Accountability 
In brief, the first part of this two-part proposal is for all the MDBs to create one combined IAM 
that has the authority to receive requests for investigations from people who allege that they 
have been harmed by the failure of any MDB to comply with its own policies and procedures. 
The second part is to create an assistance fund that can provide support to help communities 
and individuals who are found by the IAM to have been harmed by a non-compliant MDB-
funded project. Each aspect of this proposal is discussed in more detail below. 
One IAM for all MDBs 
The proposal is that there should be one “super-IAM” (S-IAM) that can serve all the MDBs.35 
This S-IAM, which would be created by agreement between all participating MDBs, would be 
free-standing which means that it would be independent of all the MDBs. Since it would provide 
an accountability service to all the MDBs, each of them would contribute to its budget on a pro-
rata basis according to the number of cases arising from each participating MDB. The MDB 
boards of directors would all vote to approve the members of the S-IAM. Each MDB would 
agree to second staff to it for a stipulated period, for example-three years.  
This S-IAM would operate according to similar compliance review procedures as all the 
currently functioning IAMs. This means that it would be authorized to accept requests for 
investigation from any two or more persons who allege that they have been harmed or 
threatened with harm because of the failure of the MDB or MDBs funding a particular project 
to comply with the applicable OPPs. The S-IAM would determine for itself the eligibility of the 
request and, if found eligible, would investigate the issues raised in the request based on the 
applicable OPPs. The reports of the investigation would be submitted to the Board of Executive 
Director of the relevant MDB. The board would be required to either accept the findings of the 
S-IAM and ensure that the management develops an action plan that is designed to resolve the
35 All the existing IAMs except the World Bank Inspection Panel offer requesters the possibility of engaging in a 
voluntary dispute resolution process or a compliance review. This proposal only deals with compliance review. 
In principle, the proposal is compatible with either leaving each institution free to conduct its own dispute 
resolution process or with incorporating a dispute resolution process into the “super-IAM”. However, the 
appropriate structuring of a dispute resolution process in an IAM is a complex issue and it is not possible to do it 
justice within the space constraints of this paper. Consequently, dispute resolution is not discussed in this paper. 
See, Joshua M. Javits, Internal Conflict Resolution at International Organizations, 28(2)ABA J. LAB. & EMP. 
L.223-253 (2015) for more information on dispute resolution in an IAM.
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cases of non-compliance identified in the report or to issue a public explanation of their reasons 
for rejecting the findings. As is the practice in almost all the current IAMs, the report would 
also be made available to the requesters at the same time as it is provided to the relevant board. 
The S-IAM would also monitor the implementation of the action plan in order to ensure that it 
in fact resolves the problems that it identified in its investigation report.  
It is not unprecedented for one review mechanism to have the authority to deal with cases 
applying the rules of different international organizations. The ILO Administrative Tribunal is 
authorized to decide cases based on the human resource policies of each of the organizations 
that have accepted its authority to hear employment disputes. Currently, 57 organizations have 
agreed to use the ILO Administrative Tribunal for this purpose.36 
This S-IAM offers a number of advantages. First, it clearly demonstrates that the MDBs are 
offering those who have been harmed by non-compliant projects a meaningful alternative to a 
judicial remedy. This should help reduce the risk of litigation created by the Jam v IFC case 
and thereby also help preserve the appropriate level of immunity for the MDBs. Second, 
because the S-IAM is gathering information from investigations at all the MDBs, it will develop 
a rich database of information on the implementation of the OPPs of the MDBs. This will 
contribute to the lessons learned function of the IAMs. The additional knowledge about how to 
assess and manage the social and environmental impacts should lead to improvements in the 
design and implementation of MDB funded projects and the formulation and interpretation of 
their OPPs. Third, it would mitigate the risk of inconsistent decisions in cases of jointly funded 
projects.  
The S-IAM will have some costs. Most significantly, there is a cost associated with the fact that 
the IAM will not be located in any MDB. This means that it will lose the familiarity with the 
MDB that the current IAMs can gain from interacting with the MDB staff and management on 
a regular basis. There are two factors that suggest that this cost may not be significant. The first 
is that the staff of the S-IAM will be officials seconded from the various MDBs. Consequently, 
they will understand their own MDB well and so can help educate and inform the members of 
the S-IAM about the culture and operating practices of the MDB. In addition, many of the 
36 For information on the ILO Administrative Tribunal, see: THE ILO ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, 
https://www.ilo.org/tribunal/lang--en/index.htm (last visited on May 12, 2019). 
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members of the current IAMs do not serve on a full-time basis and so do not interact on a regular 
basis with the staff and management. In addition, since they only serve for a fixed term and 
only after not being employed in any capacity by the MDB for a set period before appointment, 
they are unlikely to have great familiarity with the MDBs staff and management when they join 
the IAM. They are also unlikely to develop it during their tenure.  
A second potential cost is that the S-IAM will have a large number of cases and will therefore 
need a large budget and staff. There is no doubt that the S-IAM will need a larger staff and more 
resources than any one of the currently existing IAMs. However, it is reasonable to expect that 
the S-IAM will need a smaller staff than the sum of the total staff at the existing IAMs. The 
reason is that the S-IAM will have a full-time panel. The current arrangements at the IAMs 
involve part-time panel members. Thus, a smaller number of S-IAM panel members than the 
sum of the current total of IAM members should be possible. It is also possible that the more 
effective learning process that the S-IAM offers all the MDBs could result in less cases of non-
compliant projects brought to the S-IAM than the total being brought to the current IAMs.  
While the S-IAM will be larger than that at any of the existing IAMs, it will not result in a large 
permanent bureaucracy. The S-IAM staff will consist of panellists who have been appointed 
for fixed non-renewable terms and experts who are seconded for fixed periods of time from the 
various MDBs. Thus, the staff will all be temporary and will work with the expectation that 
they will be returning to their home MDB. It is important to note that the creation of the S-IAM 
need not lead to additional financial costs for each MDB. The reason is that the creation of the 
S-IAM, will allow each MDB to shut down its own IAM and use the funds for the S-IAM.
An Assistance Fund 
The second part of this proposal is that that all the stakeholders in the MDBs should create an 
independent Assistance Fund (the Fund) that can accept contributions from individuals, 
corporations, foundations, states and international organizations. This Fund will provide 
assistance to communities that the S-IAM finds have been harmed by an MDB’s failure to 
comply with the applicable OPPs. All the categories of potential contributors have expressed 
an interest in promoting both accountability at the MDBs and concern for the groups that have 
been harmed by the MDBs’ failure to comply with their OPPs. Consequently, they should be 
willing to contribute to a Fund that is independent of the MDBs, and that can assist individuals 
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and communities who the S-IAM has found were harmed by the relevant MDB’s failure to 
comply with its own OPPs. Any award made by this Fund will not require a finding that any 
particular party is to blame for the harm that they have suffered. Instead, it will be premised 
merely on the finding that they have suffered harm and need assistance.  
It is important to note that independent international funds that can raise funds from both state 
and non-state actors to support specific purposes are not unprecedented. The following 
international funds allow for contributions by non-state actors: The Trust Fund for Victims at 
the International Criminal Court allows for individuals to contribute to the Trust Fund;37 The 
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Inoculations (GAVI) accepts contributions from states, 
foundations, civil society organizations(CSOs), corporations, and individuals38; the Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria allows states, corps, foundations, and CSOs to 
contribute;39 and the Global Partnership for Education accepts contributions from governments, 
international organizations, foundations and the private sector.40 
The Fund, will be overseen by a Board of Directors. The board members will participate in 
their individual capacity and will be elected by all contributors to the Fund. The Board will 
outsource the investing of the corpus of the Fund and the management of its financial 
transactions to a fund manager.   
The Board will also receive all requests for assistance. Any requester who submitted a request 
for investigation to the S-IAM and was found to have been harmed by the non-compliance of 
the relevant MDB will be eligible to file a request with the Fund. The request for assistance 
would include a copy of the report of the S-IAM finding that the requester has suffered harm 
because of the failure of the MDB to comply with its own OPPs and a motivation for the 
37See DONATIONS TO THE TRUST FUND FOR VICTIMS,https://www.trustfundforvictims.org/en/your-support/make-
a-donation (last visited on May 12, 2019); Also see, Frederick Megret, Justifying Compensation by the 
International Criminal Court's Victims Trust Fund: Lessons from Domestic Compensation Schemes, 36 BROOK. 
J. INT'L L. (2010). For a more sceptical view see, David Scheffer, The Rising Challenge of Funding Victims’ Needs
at the International Criminal Court, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 3, 2018) https://www.justsecurity.org/61701/rising-
challenge-funding-victims-international-criminal-court/.
38See FUNDING THE GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR VACCINES AND INOCULATIONS 
(GAVI),https://www.gavi.org/investing/funding/ (last visited on May 12, 2019). 
39See FUNDING MODEL: THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TB AND MALARIA,
https://www.theglobalfund.org/en/funding-model/ (last visited on May 12, 2019). 
40Se FUNDING THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR EDUCATION, https://www.globalpartnership.org/funding(last 
visited on May 12, 2019). 
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amount of assistance being requested. In no case, can the request exceed the amount that the 
requesters would have received under the relevant MDB’s OPPs. The decision to provide 
assistance will be made by the Fund’s Board. In determining the amount of assistance, the 
Board will consider the severity of the harm suffered, and the amount of funds available that 
year for assisting requesters. 
The rationale for the Fund is that it is not inherently unreasonable for a society to decide that 
since a particular project will produce benefits for the whole society over time, the social, 
environmental, economic, and financial costs of the project should be shared by the whole 
society. However, a problem arises when there has been a finding that a non-compliant MDB 
has contributed to the costs falling disproportionately on a particular group or community in 
the society. In this case, there is a basis for the international community providing the group or 
community with special assistance to deal with its “disproportionate” share of the costs.  
The Fund enables the requesters to receive this assistance while avoiding the problems that 
would arise if the funds used to assist the affected group were contributed only by the relevant 
MDB. As indicated above, this could mean that the funds are ultimately paid by the borrower 
through an increase in the size of its loan or by the other borrower member states through 
reduced availability of financing. After all, this would be another way of imposing a 
disproportionate cost on one group of stakeholders in the MDBs. 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that the world in which the MDBs must operate has changed dramatically 
since the first MDBs were created. They now have detailed OPPs to deal with the social and 
environmental impacts of their operations that inform interested stakeholders about how they 
can expect the MDBs to deal with these impacts. In addition, based on international law and 
the evolving case law, the MDBs need to provide those who claim they have been harmed by 
the failure of the MDBs to act in compliance with these OPPs with a meaningful means of 
holding these MDBs accountable for their own failings. It therefore proposes that the MDBs 
create a super-IAM to replace their individual IAMs. This S-IAM would be authorized to 
receive and investigate claims from any of the MDBs. Its findings would be binding on the 
relevant MDB unless the board of that MDB provides a specific public explanation for their 
rejection of the findings.  
17 
In addition, in order to ensure that any community or group who has been harmed by the non-
compliant acts of the relevant MDB is assisted to address its harm and that the assistance does 
not come at the expense of the relevant MDB’s member states, the MDBs should create an 
independent Assistance Fund. The Fund should be authorized to receive contributions from 
any state or non-state actor. It should only be able to provide assistance in cases where there 
has been a finding of MDB non-compliance.  
If the MDBs implement these two proposals, they will have created a structure that respects 
the sovereignty of their member states and the rights of all project affected groups and 
communities. It will also provide the basis for courts and member states governments to 
provide MDBs with an appropriate level of immunity.  
